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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

Some well recognized grounds for the writ involving due
process are (1) denial of the right of counsel, 15 (2) insanity of
the accused,l 6 (3) perjured testimony within the knowledge
of the prosecuting officer,17 (4) plea of guilty induced by fraud
or misrepresentation,s and (5) withholding of material testimony by the prosecuting officer. 19
North Dakota has expressly abolished the writ of coram
nobis in civil actions and has replaced it with a motion to set
aside judgment.20- Essentially a civil remedy, the motion has
been recognized by North Dakota as a means of vacating a
criminal conviction. Where so applied it has been said to be
analogous to coram nobis.2 1 The motion has been held to lie
where the defendant was not properly advised to his right to
counsel,22 and where a plea of guilty was obtained by fraud,
23
duress or coercion.
It is submitted that each state should provide some adequate
remedy whereby a post-trial procedure is available to test the
legality of a conviction even though it appears proper on the
surface. The instant case is an indication of the scope and
flexibility of such a remedy. North Dakota's motion to set
aside judgment, if liberally interpreted, should adequately
provide a remedy to insure due process.
LARRY KRAFT
EMINENT DOMAIN-COMPENSATION-STATE
ACQUISITION
OF LAND PREVIOUSLY DEVOTED To A PUBLIC USE-The State

Road Commission filed an interlocutory appeal to determine whether they must compensate the defendant
Board of Education for a public school condemned
for freeway purposes. The Supreme Court of Utah
held, two justices dissenting, that because the statutes of Utah
did not differentiate between methods of taking public or
15. Hogan v. Court of General Sessions of New York County, 296 N.Y.
1, 68 N.E.2d 849, 852 (1946). See People v. Silverman, 3 N.Y.2d 200, 165
N.Y.S.2d 11 (1957).
16. People v. Hill, 9 App. Div. 2d 451, 195 N.Y.S.2d 295, 296 (1959);
Lee v. State, 35 Ala. 38, 44 So. 2d 606 (1949).
17. Davis v. State, 200 Ind. 99, 161 N.E. 375, 381 (1928); People v.
Steele, 65 N.Y.S.2d 214, 221 (1946).
18. People v. Docetti, 9 App. Div. 2d 740, 192 N.Y.S.2d
907, 908
(1959); People v. Farina, 2 App. Div. 2d 776, 154 N.Y.S.2d 501, 502 (1956).
19. People v. Anderson, 4 App. Div. 2d 886, 167 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1957);
People v. Fisher, 9 App. Div. 2d 836, 192 N.Y.S.2d 741, 751 (1958).
20. See N.D. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60(b).
21. See Judge Burke's opinion in State v. Magrum, 76 N.D. 528, 530; 38
N.W.2d 358, 360 (1949).
22. State v. Magrum, 76 N.D. 528, 536; 38 N.W.2d 358, 366 (1949).
23. State v. Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d 599, 612 (N.D. 1954).
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private property and since no provision excluded the payment,
the right of the Board to compensation was identical to that of
a private owner. The majority felt it would be inequitable to
impose the entire cost of the right of way upon an individual
school board. The dissent criticized the result on the grounds
that the Board of Education as an agent of the state held the
school in a governmental capacity and therefore no compensation was necessary. State v. Salt Lake City Public Board of
Education, 368 P.2d 468 (Utah 1962).
When federal acquisition of municipal property previously
devoted to a public use abridges a property right created by
the state, just compensation is required.1 Compensation for
state condemnation of land devoted to a public use is normally
based upon whether the property is held by the municipal
corporation in its governmental capacity, or its proprietary
capacity.2 In the former, it is held by the municipality as an
agency of the state, subject to control by the state. 3 Property
so held may be reclaimed by the state without compensation.4
Property held in a proprietary capacity by the municipality
is for the sole benefit of its citizens and itself, and cannot be
taken without payment.5
Often an activity which in one jurisdiction has been classified as governmental is accepted as proprietary in another.6
Among those activities on which the courts have conflicted are
the establishment and maintenance of public parks,' municipal
airports, 8 public swimming pools, 9 and the repair of
1. Town of Bedford v. United States, 23 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1927).
2. Winchester v. Cox, 129 Conn. 106, 26 A.2d 592 (1942); Proprietors of
Mt. Hope Cemetery v. City of Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 33 N.E. 695 (1893);
State Highway Commission v. City of Elizabeth, 102 N.J. Eq. 221, 140 Atl.
335 (1928).
3. State Highway Commission v. City of Elizabeth, 102 N.J.Eq. 221, 140
Atl. 335 (1928); City of Schenectady v. State of New York, 6 Misc. 2d 232,
162 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1957).
4. Burnes v. Metropolitan District Commission, 325 Mass. 731, 92 N.E.2d
381 (1950); Lowell v. City of Boston, 322 Mass. 709, 79 N.E.2d 713 (1948).
5. Winchester v. Cox, 129 Conn. 106, 26 A.2d 592 (1942); Village of Canajoharte v. State, 13 Misc. 2d 293, 177 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1958).
6. Compa-e Redell v. Moores, 63 Neb. 219, 88 N.W. 243 (1901) (where
the fire department was held to be under the states control) with Davidson
v. Hine, 151 Mich. 294, 115 N.W. 246 (1908) (where the fire department was
held to be a function of the city as private property).
7. Compare State v. City of Albuquerque, 67 N.ML 383, 355 P.2d 925
(1960) (proprietary) with City of Schenectady v. State of New York, 6
Misc. 2d 232, 162 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1957) (governmental).
8. Compare People v. Wood, 391 111. 237, 62 N.E.2d 809 (1945) (governmental) with Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati, 166 N.E.2d 788
(Ohio Com. P1. 1960) (proprietary, but case later reversed on other
grounds).
9. Compare Hannon v. City of Waterbury, 106 Conn. 13, 136 Atl. 876
(1927) (governmental as to tort liability) with Burton v. Salt Lake City,
69 Utah 186, 253 Pac. 443 (1926) (proprietary function when dealing with
tort liability).
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streets. 10 One state court has adjudged an activity to be governmental for one purpose and proprietary for another.The manner in which the municipality acquired the property
is also an important factor in determining whether compensation must be paid.12 In acquiring property, dedication of land
by a private owner to the city to be used as a public park entitled zhe city to payment upon condemnation by the state. 13
However, where a city used bonds to finance a public park
originally, the state was not obligated to pay since they then
14
held in tenure of the state.
It has been established that the state is served in a governmental manner by schools,1 boards of education,16 and school
districts." The courts have reached this conclusion on education by stating that (1) public schools are conducted for the
benefit of the entire state and not just for the particular locale
they serve, i8 (2) school districts are created to effectively
carry out the state's education, 9 and (3) by creation school
boards and districts are involuntary corporations organized
for the public benefit with only limited powers. 20 However, a
school district was awarded payment merely because its school
code gave it the power to own land in fee, and the governmental-proprietary distinction was not brought into play."
North Dakota has allowed a school district to acquire a fee
simple title to a site for school purposes by the use of eminent
domain proceedings. 2" No case directly involving the right of
the state to condemn land devoted to a public use could be
10. Compare State ex rel Schlegal v. Munn, 216 Iowa 1232, 250 N.W. 471
(1933) (governmental) With Blue v. city of Union, 159 Ore. 5, 75 P.2d 977
(1938) (proprietary).
11. Compare Fay v. City of Trenton, 126 N.J.L 52, 18 A.2d 66 (1941)
with Perth Ambroy v. Barker, 74 N.J.L. 127, 65 Atl. 201 (1906) (public waterworks held to be governmental as to taxation, proprietary as to liability
in tort action).
12. See, e.g., Parr, State Condemnation of Municipally Owned Property:
The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction, 11 Syracuse L. Rev. 27 (1959).
. 13. Winchester v. Cox, 129 Conn. 106, 26 A.2d 592 (1942); State Highway
Commissioner v. Cooper, 24 N.J. 261, 131 A.2d 756 (1957).
14. City of -c&enectady v. State of New York, 6 Misc. 2d 232, 162 N.Y.S.
2d 262 (1957).
15. Brown v. Board of Trustees, etc., 303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866 (1952);
Consolidated School Dist. v. Wright, 128 Okla. 193, 261 Pac. 953 (1927).
16. Bingham v. Board of Education, 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432 (1950).
17. School District v. Rivera, 30 Ariz. 1, 243 Pac. 609 (1926); Bank v.
Brainerd School Dist., 49 Minn. 106, 51 N.W. 814 (1892).
18. Braun v. Victoria Independent School Dist., 114 S.W.2d 947, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1938).
19. Florman v. School District, 6 Colo. App. 319, 40 Pac. 469 (1895).
20. School District v. Rivera, 30 Ariz. 1, 243 Pac. 609 (1926); Redfield v.
School District, 48 Wash. 85, 92 Pac. 770 (1907).
21. School District of Borough of Speers v. Commonwealth, 383 Pa. 205,
117 A.2d 702 (1955).
22. Board of Education of City of Minot v. Park District, 70 N.W.2d 899
(N.D. 1955).
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found, although the power is conferred to them.23 It is submitted that by the wording of our statutes,24 the holder to the fee
in these public lands would be awarded compensation by the
state without regard to whether the land is being used in a
governmental or proprietary capacity by the owner.
BENNY
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FECTIVENESS AS TEMPORARY OR INTERIM INSURANCE-The de-

fendant had issued a conditional receipt for premium deposit
to an applicant for a life insurance policy.1 On the back of this
receipt was a clause providing that in the event of rejection
of the application the deposit had to be returned to the applicant. The application was rejected by the insurance company.
The insurance agent did not attempt to return the premium
payment to the applicant until two days after her death, which
occurred seventeen days after the initial deposit.
Plaintiff beneficiary brought an action to recover the full
amount of the insurance. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas held, two justices dissenting, that the defendant was
not liable since the policy clearly meant that there would be no
protection until the deceased was accepted as insurable. The
dissent claimed there was sufficient ambiguity in the policy to
allow an interpretation of the policy as providing a period of
interim insurance until rejection of the policy by returning the
deposit to the applicant. The Nat'l. Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v.
Baker, 354 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. 1962).
A conditional or binding receipt has been accepted as providing a present period of interim insurance until either ac23. N.D.
Cent. Code
§ 32-15-04
(3)
"Property appropriated
to
public use, but such property shall not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than that to which it has been appropriated already, . . ."
24. N.D. Cent. Code § 32-15-04 "The private property which may be
taken under this chapter includes: (3) Property appropriated to public
use . . ." and § 32-15-01, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation first having been made to or paid
into court for the owner."
1.
"If... (2) the proposed insured is, on the date of said deposit and on
the date of any required medical examination, insurable and acceptable in
the opinion of the Company's authorized officers . . . then upon the death or
bodily injury of the proposed insured prior to the date of issue and within
thirty-one days of the date of said deposit, the Company will pay the
benefit, if any, which would have been payable under the provisions of
said policy had its date of Issue been the date of said deposit." The Nat'l.
Life and Ace. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 354 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ark. 1962).

